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BIDS AS ACCEPTANCES IN AUCTIONS "WITHOUT
RESERVE"
By HARVEY HOSHOUR*
As an original problem in elementary contract law there would
seem to be little difficulty in concluding that in those cases in
which an auction sale has been announced to be without reserve
the bids are acceptances, conditional on no higher bid being re-
ceived. One who accepts as correct the objective theory as to
mutual assent in the formation of contracts ' will make the de-
terminant of whether a given act is an offer largely the viewpoint
of the person to whom the act is addressed, acting reasonably.
2
The interpretation suggested only makes articulate what is be-
lieved would be the reasonable conclusion of those who buy at
auction.
However clear this may be on principle, the decided cases,
particularly in this country, have generally held otherwise,3 and
eminent commentators have supported the opposite view.4 It is
the purpose of this article to show the development in the English
and American law toward the conclusion that in this class of cases
the bids are acceptances and create contracts of sale. It is be-
lieved that this conclusion is sound in theory; that it is not in-
consistent with other well settled rules; and that the law has so
evolved that it should be adopted by the courts in deciding cases
of this type.
*Professor of Law, Law School, University of Minnesota.
'See Williston, Mutual Assent in Formation of Contract, (1919)
14 Ill. L. Rev. 85; Oliphant, Duration and Termination of an Offer (1920)
18 Mich. L. Rev. 201.
-See Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, (1917) 26 Yale L. J. 169, 182.
'The cases are discussed in detail infra. The problem is of special in-
terest in Minnesota because the leading case in this country contra to the
view here supported was decided by the Minnesota supreme court: Anderson
v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry. Co., (1909) 107 Minn. 296, 120 N. W. 39.4Pollock, Principles of Contract, 9th ed., pp. 19, 20; 1 Williston, Con-
tracts 41 to 43.
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The meaning of an announcement that a sale is to be without
reserve is not doubtful. Such meaning is two-fold: (1) that the
vendor will not himself bid; and (2) that the goods will be sold
to the highest bidder. Lord Mansfield aptly paraphrased these
two meanings in a single clause: "that the goods shall go to the
highest real bidder." 5 Although both meanings follow with equal
certainty from the words themselves only that first stated has
uniformly been made effective in the law. Indeed it is well settled
that unless the sale be announced to be with reserve the vendor
may not bid.6 It is not that the cases hold that the words "with-
out reserve" do not mean that the goods are to go to the highest
bidder, but that, largely on the ground of consistency with another
rule shortly to be considered, neither party at an auction may be
held contractually bound until the fall of the hammer. Thus an
obvious meaning of the words used in the announcement is made
wholly ineffective. Since the argument of inconsistency has
played so large a part in the matter it seems proper at the outset
briefly to consider the rule that has been thought to be controlling
or at least to be so inconsistent with the rule here supported as
to justify a contrary conclusion.
The rule referred to is based on the decision in the leading
case of Parne v. Cave.7 In that case there was no announcement
that-the sale was to be without reserve.8 There the bidder with-
drew his bid when the auctioneer, after having stated that the
distilling apparatus involved weighed a certain amount, refused
to warrant the truth of his statement. Later the same bidder
bought the article for a smaller sum, and suit was brought by the
vendor for the difference between the amounts of the two bids.
Plaintiff was held to have no cause of action on the ground that
the bids were offers only and revocable until assented to by the
,vendor or the auctioneer. It has cogently been urged that the
putting up of goods is an offer to sell to the highest bidder, and
5Bexwell v. Christie, (1776) 1 Cowper 395, 397.
61 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 298; section 58, English Sale of Goods
Act; section 21, Uniform Sales Act.
7(1789) 3 Durn. & E. 148.
sIn Payne v. Cave, (1789) 3 Durn. & E. 148 plaintiff pleaded that it was
a usual condition in auction sales that the highest bidder should be the
purchaser, but it was not claimed at the trial that there was an express pro-
vision in the announcement to that effect. Therefore Payne v. Cave has
been rightly interpreted as holding only that the putting up of goods by the
auctioneer is not an offer. See 1 Williston, Contracts, sec. 29; Leake, Con-
tracts, 7th ed., p. 24; Pollock, Principles of Contract, 9th ed., p. 16; Lang-
dell, Summary of the Law of Contracts, sec. 19.
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that therefore Payne v. Cave was wrongly decided.9 Whatever
the merits of such argument, Payne v. Cave has been uniformly
followed in cases factually similar,1" and discussion of the pro-
priety of the rule of that case is academic at this time. A number
of the decided cases, as will appear more fully in the analysds
thereof following, as well as several writers on the subject, 1
argue that, since it is settled that the bids are not acceptances in
cases of the Payne v. Cave type, it is inconsistent with the rule of
that case to hold that they are acceptances in cases of the sort here
under discussion.
It is believed, however, that there is no inconsistency between
the two rules. It is the very fact that the sale is announced to be
without reserve by the person who is responsible therefor that
justifies the bidders, acting reasonably, in understanding that the
property involved will be sold to the highest bidder, and that in
such case a sale will be completed by each bid, subject only to the
condition that no higher bid be received. It is conceivable that
bidders would understand without such statement or its equivalent
that even the putting up of goods does not constitute an offer, but
where the sale has been announced to be without reserve the pro-
position is so unequivocal that a reasonable bidder could, it is sub-
mitted, understand it as meaning only one thing. Consistency does
not require that because bids in one class of auction cases are held
offers they must be so held in all classes of auction cases. The
fact that advertisements are not generally held to be offers does
not condemn such cases as Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co."
Even if the two rules were inconsistent it should make no difference
if the rule here supported be right." But when the reasons justi-
fying this rule are considered there is no inconsistency. Payne v.
9Langdell, Summary of the Law of Contracts, sec. 19.
10See cases cited in 1 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 296.
"The inconsistency argument is best stated in 1 Williston, Contracts,
sec. 30, as follows:
"Indeed the contrary view is inconsistent with the numerous decisions
holding that the sale of the property is not complete until the fall of the
hammer; for if the announcement by the auctioneer that he is to sell goods
without reserve amounts to an offer, and the advertised terms and condi-
tions of the sale are also offers to contract, it seems impossible to deny that
the actual putting up of the goods, a much stronger act than merely adver-
tising that they are to be put up, is also an offer."
See also 1 Halsbury's Laws of England. 511 footnote (r) to sec. 1039.
1211893] 1 Q. B. 256, 62 L. J. Q. B. 257.
"3Cf. Holmes, The Common Law 36: "The truth is, that the law is
always approaching, and never reaching, consistency. It is forever adopting
new principles from life at one end, and it always retains old ones from
history at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed off. It
will become entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow."
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Cave may have been decided wrongly, but, rightly or wrongly, it
is not controlling here, nor do the two rules seem essentially in-
consistent.
The development in the law of the view here supported is
interesting, and its tenacity, notwithstanding fairly general critical
disapproval, alone would justify a more careful consideration
thereof than has been given it. For convenience the relevant
English cases and statutes will be first considered.
The first case in point of time that suggests the problem is
Bexwefl v. Christie.14 There defendant auctioneer sold a horse
formerly owned by plaintiff for an amount considerably less than
that specified in plaintiff's directions. The announced conditions
of the sale, apparently known to plaintiff, were that "the highest
bidder shall be the purchaser." Plaintiff's theory of suit was that
under his directions it was defendant's duty to employ puffers so
as to protect plaintiff's price limit. In holding for defendant the
precise point decided was that it would be a fraud on the bidders
to permit the vendor, directly or indirectly, to bid, but the language
of Lord Mansfield is almost equally applicable to the instant
problem:
"The basis of all dealings ought to be in good faith; so, more
especially in these transactions, where the public are brought to-
gether upon a confidence that the articles set up to sale will be
disposed of to the highest real bidder; that such could never be
the case if the owner might secretly and privately inhance the
price by a person employed for that purpose; .. .What is the
nature of a sale by auction? It is, that the goods shall go to the
highest real bidder." 15
So in the situation here under discussion, using Lord Mansfield's
language, where the bidders are brought together upon a confidence
that the goods will be sold to the highest bidder the law should
protect that confidence. Only by the view here supported can this
be done in line with contract law.
The leading English case in point is Warlow v. Harrison,"6
decided by the Court of Exchequer Chamber in 1859. Indeed the
principle under consideration has been discussed largely with ref-
erence to this one case." Here the sale was announced to be
without reserve, and plaintiff, who was the highest real bidder,
14(1776) 1 Cowper 395.
'
5 Bexwell v. Christie, (1776) 1 Cowper 395, 396, 397.
16(1859) 1 E. & E. 309.
"7See, Smith, Sales Without Reserve, (1915) 40 L. Mag. and Rev., 5th
Ser. p. 173. Note in 57 L. R. A. 784.
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sued the auctioneer (the principal not being disclosed) on the
theory that defendant became the agent of plaintiff to complete
the contract, which defendant failed to do. In the Court of
Queen's Bench'0 counsel for plaintiff argued that "where the sale
by the conditions is without reserve, the bidder is absolutely the
purchaser unless there be a bona fide higher bidder." That court,
however, was impressed with the thought that this argument was
"wholly at variance with the case of Payne v. Cave"19 and non-
suited the plaintiff. In the Exchequer Chamber the court x,'as of
the opinion that the judgment should be affirmed on the pleadings
as they stood, but thought that plaintiff had a cause of action on
another theory. Accordingly the judgment was affirmed "unless
the parties elect to enter a stet processus, or the plaintiff amend his
declaration; in which latter case, a new trial to be had."20  A
stet processus was entered into and the case was not re-tried.2 1
In connection with the proposed amendment the court used the
following language:
"The name of the auctioneers, of whom the defendant was
one, alone was published; and the sale was announced by them
to be without reserve. This, according to all the cases both at
law and equity, means that neither the vendor nor any person in
his behalf shall bid at the auction, and that the property shall be
sold to the highest bidder, whether the sum bid be equivalent to
the real value or not; Thornett v. Haines, 15 M. & W. 367. We
cannot distinguish the case of an auctioneer putting up property
for sale upon such a condition from the case of the loser of prop-
erty offering a reward, or that of a railway company publishing a
time table stating the times when, and the places to which, the
trains run. It has been decided that the person giving the in-
formation advertised for, or a passenger taking a ticket, may sue
as upon a contract with him: Denton v. Great Northern Railway
Company, 5 E. & B. 860. Upon the same principle, it seems to us
that the highest bona fide bidder at an auction may sue the
auctioneer as upon a contract that the sale shall be without reserve.
We think the auctioneer who puts the property up for sale upon
such a condition pledges himself that the sale shall be without
reserve; or, in other words, contracts that it shall be so; and that
this contract is made with the highest bona fide bidder; and, in
case of a breach of it, that he has a right of action against the
auctioneer. The case is not at all affected by the 17th section of
18(1858) 1 E. & E. 295.
19(1858) 1 E. & E. 295, 307.
20(1859) 1 E. & E. 309, 318.
* 
2
'The fact that a stet processus was entered into in Warlow v. Harrison
(1859) 1 E. & E. 309 is stated in the opinion in Mainprice v. Westley, (1865)
6 B. & S. 420, 429.
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the statute of frauds, which relates only to direct sales, and not
to contracts relating to or connected with them. '22
The quotation is from the opinion of the majority of the court.
Two of the five judges, (all the judges concurring in the disposi-
tion of the case,) based their conclusion as to the amendment on
the ground that defendant's announcement was in effect a war-
ranty, and, there being evidence that he had no authority to sell
without reserve, plaintiff's cause of action should be for a breach
of such warranty.
The language quoted from the opinion of Warlow v. Harrisnz
has been thought to be dictum.23  This position, however, seems
untenable, for, as the court pointed out in the opinion, "there is
power given to the court to amend; and it has been held that this
power extends to the Court of Appeal; and we think we ought to
exercise it largely in order to carry out the object of the Common
Law Procedure Acts, 1852 and 1854 viz., to determine the real
question in controversy between the parties in the existing suit.
24
A more difficult question is as to what the language referred
to actually meant to hold. Pollock thinks that the case is a
"holding in effect (contrary to the general rule as to sales by
auction) that where the sale is without reserve the contract is
completed not by the acceptance of a bidding, but by the bidding
itself, subject to the condition that no higher bona fide bidder
appears.
25
This conclusion is in line with the analogies referred to by the
court. The reward and time table cases do seem indistinguishable
from the situation here involved. If this interpretation be correct,
Warlow v. Hvrrison is directly in point in favor of the proposition
herein supported.
However, Pollock's interpretation, desirable though it is, does
not seem justified by the opinion in Warlow v. Harrison taken as
a whole. In the first place if the court had meant so to hold, there
would have been no need for an amendment, for such in substance
was plaintiff's theory in his original declaration. Again the last
sentence quoted with reference to the statute of frauds shows
clearly that what the court had in mind was some sort of collateral
22(1859) 1 E. & E. 309,. 316, 317.
22Smith, Sales Without Reserve, (1915) 40 L. Mag. and Rev., 5th Ser.
173; Mainprice v. Westley, (1865) 6 B. & S. 420.
24(1889) 1 E. & E. 309, 316.
25Pollock, Principles of Contract, 9th ed., p. 19. Substantially to the
same effect is Anson, Contracts, Turck's Edition, pp. 77-78.
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contract to sell to the highest bidder as distinct from a direct
sale by the bid as an acceptance.
26
In Mainprice vu. Westley:- similar facts to those in Warlow v.
Harrison were involved except that defendant auctioneer's princi-
pal was disclosed; and the holding was that in such case no action
lies against the auctioneer. Warlow v. Harrison was distinguished,
with some suggestion that the discussion of the point in Warlow v.
Harrison was dictum.26  The court, however, was careful to point
out that no decision was made as to whether or not plaintiff had
a cause of action against the principal.
29
In Spencer v. Harding," the well known tender case, the
language used in what was claimed to be the offer was held insuf-
ficient to support a finding that it was an offer in law, but the
court added:
"If the circular had gone on, 'and we undertake to sell to the
highest bidder,' the reward cases would have applied and there
would have been a good contract with respect of the persons. 13 '
Obviously the dictum last quoted expresses the rule here sup-
ported, and it should be noted in this connection that suit in
Spencer v. Harding was brought on a claimed contract of sale,
not on a collateral contract.
In Harris v. Nickerson32 plaintiff sued defendant auctioneer for
expenses incurred in attending the sale, certain of the goods having
been withdrawn. Judgment for defendant was ordered. Warlow
v. Harrison was cited with apparent approval by two of the
judges,33 but since plaintiff did not claim to be the highest bidder
it did not become necessary to apply the rule of that case.
20 Williston, Contracts, sec. 30, interprets the decision in Warlow v.
Harrison thus: "In England it has been decided that a collateral contract
is formed by the attendance of the bidders at the auction; that is, the auc-
tioneer is held to offer to observe the advertised conditions (as to sell without
reserve) in consideration of the bidders attendance and taking part in the
auction." The last conclusion that the consideration is the attendance and
taking part in the auction by the bidders seems questionable. Only the
highest bidder, not all bidders, should have a cause of action, (see Harris v.
Nickerson, (1873) 8 Q. B. 286) and it seems more correct to interpret
Warlow v. Harrison as holding that a unilateral contract was formed with
the highest bidder, such bid being the act bargained for. However that may
be, the collateral contract interpretation of the decision in Warlow v. Harri-
son seems inescapable, notwithstanding Sir Frederick Pollock's view other-
wise.
27(1865) 6 B. & S. 420.
28(1865) 6 B. & S. 420, 427.
29(1865) 6 B. & S. 420, 430.
30(1870) L. R. 5 C. P. 561.
31(1870) L. R. 5 C. P. 561, 563.
132(1873) L. R. 8 Q. B. 286.
33The following language from the opinion of Judge Blackburn, who in
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In 1893 the English Sale of Goods Act was adopted, and section
58 (2) thereof is as follows:
"A sale by auction is complete when the auctioneer announces
its completion by the fall of the hammer, or in other customary
manner. Until such announcement is made any bidder may re-
tract his bid."
Thus the rule of Payne v. Cave received legislative approval in
England. There is in the English Sale of Goods Act no specific
reference to the question here under discussion. The effect of
the enactment of the rule of Payne v. Cave in the Sale of Goods
Act has been urged definitely to preclude any contractual obliga-
tion before the fall of the hammer. 4 To this argument there are
several answers. In the first place sec. 61 (2) of the English
Act is as follows:
"The rules of the common law, including the law merchant,
save in so far as that they are inconsistent with the express pro-
visions of this Act, and in particular the rules relating to the law
of principal and agent . . . shall continue to apply to contracts
for the sale of goods."
If the argument herein made be sound, there is no inconsistency
between the rule of Payne v. Cave and that here urged. Further-
more, the English courts since the adoption of the Sale of Goods
Act have continued to cite Warlow v. Harrison with approval.
Johnston v. Boye 3 5 was an action against a vendor for not
completing a sale of real. estate to plaintiff, it having been an-
nounced in effect that the sale would be without reserve. The
action was dismissed because plaintiff failed to make the payments
required, but the court cites Warlow v. Harrison with apparent
approval:
"In point of law I think such an action can be maintained. A
vendor who offers property for sale by auction on the terms of
printed conditions can be made liable to a member of the public
who accepts the offer if those conditions be violated: See Warlow
v. Harrison and the recent case of Carlill v. Carbolic Siwke Ball
Co.J36
Mainprice v. Westley indicated that he thought the language herein quoted
from Warlow v. Harrison was dictum is interesting: "In the case of Warlow
v. Harrison the opinion of the majority of the judges in the Exchequer
Chamber appears to have been that an action would lie for not knocking
down the lot to the highest bona fide bidder when the sale was advertised
as without reserve."
34Smith, Sales Without Reserve, (1915) 40 L. Mag. and Rev., 5th Ser.
173; Fenwick v. Macdonald, (1904) 6 Sess. Cas., 5th Ser. 850.
s5[1899] 2 Ch. 73, 68 L. J. Ch. Div. 425.
36[1893] 1 Q. B. 256, 62 L. J. Q. B. 257.
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In several still later English cases Warlow v. Harrison is
citedA7 Although the facts in these cases did not involve an
application of the rule there stated, it seems clear therefrom that
the English courts regard such rule as unaffected by the passage
of the Sale of Goods Act.
So much for the English authorities. The passage of the
Sale of Goods Act has had no effect other than to foreclose fur-
ther discussion of the correctness of the rule of Payne v. Cave.
The rule laid down in Warlow v. Harrison is still the law in
England. In effect that rule is that where the sale is announced to
be without reserve a collateral unilateral contract not within the
statute of frauds is formed by making the highest bid, as Mr.
Williston aptly puts it: "a collateral contract somewhat artificially
created by thd court in order to work out a just result." 3  In
addition there are dicta in the English cases that in such situation
a direct contract of sale is formed.
In America the rule under discussion has had an interesting
development. At the time Warlow v. Harrison was decided the
commissioners appointed under chapter 266 of the New York
Laws of 1857 were preparing a Civil Code for New York. When
in 1862 a draft of the proposed code was "submitted to the
judges and others for examination" section 718 thereof was as
follows:
"Rights of buyer upon sale without reserve.-If the auctioneer,
having authority to do so, has publicly announced that the sale will
be without reserve, or has made any announcement equivalent
thereto, the highest bidder in good faith has an absolute right to
the completion of the sale to him; and upon such a sale, bids by
the seller or any agent for him are void. Warlow v. Harrison, 6
Jur. (N.S.) 66, 29 L. J. (Q.B.) 14."
When the proposed code was submitted to the New York Legisla-
ture in 1879, section 900 thereof, except for verbal changes of no
consequence, was identical with section 718 of the earlier draft.
The language quoted indicates a third interpretation of Warlow
v. Harrison. The collateral contract theory is not adhered to, nor
is Pollock's interpretation of a contract of sale with the highest
bidder. The highest bidder is given a direct right to enforce the
purchase, but the vendor is given no corresponding right. Obvious-
ly this interpretation has less merit than either of those suggested
3TRainbow v. Howkins, [1904] 2 K. B. 322, 73 L. J. K. B. Div. 641;
McManus v. Fortesque, [1907] 2 K. B. 1, 76 L. J. K. B. Div. 393.
381 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., see. 297.
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heretofore. It does not follow from the language of the court in
the case relied on, and it violates the rule of contract law that if a
promise of one party to a bilateral agreement is not binding, the
return promise of the other party is not enforceable for insuffi-
ciency of consideration. However objectionable this interpreta-
tion may be it has been the corner stone of a series of statutes on
the point which have been adopted in most of the American states.
Although the Field Code (as the proposed New York code
came to be known because of its chief author) was not adopted in
New York it was used as a model for the civil codes of several
states. Thus section 1796 of the California Civil Code, enacted in
1872, is in substance precisely the same as the section of the Field
Code quoted above, as are section 1026, Dakota Civil Code; sec-
tion 5440, North Dakota Civil Code; section 1345, South Dakota
Civil Code; section 2414, Montana Civil Code. Thus what may
be termed the Field interpretation of Warlow v. Harrison came
to be adopted as part of the statute law of the four states named.
The Uniform Sales Act, now adopted in some thirty American
states and territories, inferentially follows the statutes last re-
ferred to. Section 21 (2) is the relevant portion thereof:
"A sale by auction is complete when the auctioneer announces
its completion by the fall of the hammer, or in other customary
manner. Until such announcement is made any bidder may re-
retract his bid; and the auctioneer may withdraw the goods from
sale unless the auction has been announced to be without reserve."
While the language used in the Uniform Act is not so definite as
in the statutes directly following the Field Code its effect seems
quite the same so far as the instant point is concerned as if those
statutes had been copied verbatim. The auctioneer may with-
draw the goods at any time before the fall of the hammer "unless
the auction has been announced to be without reserve." If so
announced he may not withdraw the goods. 9 Since the auctioneer
may not withdraw the highest bidder has the right to enforce the
sale. But, until the fall of the hammer, he may "retract his bid."
Thus the Field interpretation of Warlow v. Harrison is part of
the statute law of those states, including substantially all the states
of commercial importance, which have adopted the Uniform Sales
Act.4"
39See Forbes v. Hunter, (1921) 223 Ill. App. 400.
40The Commissioners' note appended to section 21 of the Uniform
Sales Act is as follows: "This follows section 58 of the English Act, and is
believed to express the existing law." While most of the content of
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Judicial approval of any of the three suggested interpretations
of Warlow v. Harrison has been slow in America. It could hardly
be expected that the courts, in the absence of a controlling statute,
would hold the vendor bound upon the making of the bid and the
vendee not then bound, and no case has been found so holding.
Several cases, however, have considered the question in general
and Warlow v. Harrison in particular.
In Boyd v. Greene4 an auction sale of real estate was adve'-
tised to take place without reserve. Plaintiff was the highest
bidder, and when the auctioneer refused to close plaintiff sued
for breach of contract of sale. Warlow v. Harrison is cited, but
the court held that the contract sued on was within the statute of
frauds and that if there was such contract it was therefore not
enforceable. The opinion contains no discussion of the correctness
of the rule of Warlow v. Harrison.
In Taylor v. Harnett,42 Warlow v. Harrison is cited with some
indication of disapproval but the decision went off on another
point and the court found it unnecessary to determine whether
Warlow v. Harrison should be followed in New York.
In McPherson v. Okanogan County43 defendant advertised
property for sale at public auction to the highest and best bidder
for cash. Plaintiff alleged that his was the highest and best bid
and asked specific performance. Defendant demurred and an
order of the trial court sustaining the demurrer was affirmed on
the ground that until the fall of the hammer in a sale by auction
neither party is bound. Warlow v. Harrison is not cited. Payne
v. Cave and cases of that type are relied on as controlling and the
distinguishing features between that kind of case and the de-
cided case are not suggested in the opinion. Obviously this deci-
sion supports the inconsistency argument against the position here-
in supported, but its omission to consider the distinguishing
section 21 follows that of Section 58 of the English Act the portion here
under discussion: "and the auctioneer may withdraw the goods from sale
unless the auction has been announced to be without reserve," is significantly
absent from the English Act. And, if the interpretation herein made be
sound that the American Act gives the bidder a direct right to enforce
the purchase without giving the vendor a corresponding right, the American
Act in respect to the point under consideration cannot be said rightly
to express the existing law, except in those states whose statutes follow
the Field Code.
41(1894) 162 Mass. 566, 39 N. E. 277.
42(1899) 37 App. Div. 253, 55 N. Y. S. 988.
43(1907) 45 Wash. 285, 88 Pac. 199, 9 L. R. A. (N.S.) 748.
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features or even to cite Warlow v. Harrison tends to lessen its
persuasiveness.
Anderson v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry. Co. 44 is the leading case on
the point in this country. The announcement of the auction there
contained neither the statement that the sale would be without
reserve nor that the property would be sold to the highest bidder.4 1
However, the court decided the case on the assumption, as claimed
by counsel for the bidder, "that an advertisement or announce-
ment of an auction sale which does not state limitations and con-
ditions is equivalent to the announcement that the sale will be
without reserve." 46  Plaintiff was the highest bidder but the
auctioneer refused to consider his bid, whereupon he sued for
breach of contract of sale. Warlow v. Harrison is referred to as
"the source of all the uncertainty," is exhaustively analyzed,47 and
is expressly disapproved largely on the ground stated in a quota-
tion from Benjamin on Sales4s that the decision in Warlow v.
Harrison is inconsistent with the English Sale of Goods Act,
which ground has already been referred to herein. The American
cases are then gone into at length and particular reliance is placed
on the McPherson Case last above referred to. The following
language of the court has been much quoted:
"Mutuality is an essential element of a contract. One party
thereto cannot be bound, and the other remain free. If the an-
nouncement of an auction is an offer to sell to the highest good-
faith bidder, and the contract is closed when the bid is made, both
the vendor and the vendee must be bound thereby. But it is
conceded by all the authorities that the bidder may withdraw his bid
at any time before the hammer falls, and this means necessarily
that the bid is a mere offer which is not binding until accepted." 49
While one may not entirely agree with the court's usage of the
term "mutuality" in this connection," there can be no question of
the essential soundness of the thought expressed in the first three
sentences of the language quoted, barring the collateral contract
44(1909) 107 Minn. 296, 120 N. W. 39, 20 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1133, 131
Am. St. Rep. 462, 16 Ann. Cas. 379.45See plaintiff's Exhibit 1, ff. 119-122, Cases & Briefs Supreme Court
of Minnesota, Oct. Term 1908, Cal. No. 197.48(1909) 107 Minn. 296, 299, 120 N. W. 39, 30 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1133,
131 Am. St. Rep. 462, 16 Ann. Cas. 379.
47(1909) 107 Minn. 296, 301-03, 120 N. W. 39, 30 L. R. A. (N.S.)
1133, 131 Am. St. Rep. 462.
'sContained on page 306 of the opinion.
49(1909) 107 Minn. 296, 313, 120 N. W. 39, L. R. A. (N.S.) 1133,
131 Am. St. Rep. 462.
5
°See 1 Williston, Contracts, sec. 140.
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theory of Warlow v. Harrison. But why should not both the
vendor and vendee be bound? The court's answer is contained in
the last sentence quoted, which sentence is supported by a number
of cited cases from other jurisdictions. However when it is
pointed out that all of these cases are of the Payne v. Cave type,
and that in none of them was there an announcement that the sale
would be without reserve, it is seen that the language quoted is
but a restatement of the inconsistency rule, which it is believed has
been shown to be of very little cogency. It is interesting that
among the authorities cited by the court in support of the last
sentence quoted are California, Civil Code, section 1794 and North
Dakota, Code, section 5438. These sections contain statements of
the rule of Payne v. Cave, but in both of these codes, as has al-
ready been pointed out herein, there are sections almost immediate-
ly following the sections referred to which give the vendee the
remedy which the Minnesota court denied him in the Anderson
Case.
In addition to the argument from authority the court in the
Anderson opinion argues from analogy :50a
"A merchant advertises that on a certain day he will sell his
goods at bargain prices; but no one imagines that the prospective
purchaser, who visits the store and is denied the right to purchase
has an action for damages against the merchant. He merely offers
to purchase, and if his offer is refused, he has no remedy, al-
though he may have lost a bargain, and have incurred expense and
lost time in visiting the store. The analogy between such a tran-
saction and an auction is at least close."
While ordinarily advertisements are not construed as offers there
is no doubt that an advertisement can be so worded as to be an
offer." ' The ultimate determinant should be the reaction on the
person addressed, acting reasonably. While no one would imagine
that a prospective purchaser in the hypothetical case put by the
court would have an action for damages if denied the right to
buy, if, on the other hand, the merchant had stated in his advertise-
ment that he had certain articles that he would sell to the first
persons offering him the price stated, could it be doubted that
such purchaser would have a cause of action if denied the goods?
And is it not true that the latter type of case is vastly closer to
5O(1909) 107 Minn. 296, 314, 120 N. W. 39, 30 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1133,
131 Am. St. Rep. 462.5lSee Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] 1 Q. B. 256, 62
L. J. Q. B. 257; Seymour v. Armstrong, (1901) 62 Kan. 720, 64 Pac. 612.
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the instant problem than the type put by the court? It is sub-
mitted that the court's argument liy analogy does not support
the conclusion reached.
In United States v. Meyer5 2 a statute provided for advertise-
ment that certain vessels should be sold " to the person offering
the highest price therefor." Pursuant to such advertisement re-
lator's bid was made and was refused by the officer in charge. It
was held that relator had no cause of action, by analogy with the
auction cases. The only case cited, however, was Blossom v.
Railroad Co.,53 which case was of the Payne v. Cave type and was
decided almost exclusively on the authority of Payne v. Cave. All
of the comment herein made with reference to the Anderson Case
is applicable to the decision in the Meyer Case. These cases seem
to assume that it is not possible for a vendor to make an offer in
an advertisement for an auction, a conclusion that is submitted to
be untenable in theory and unfair in practice.
In Freenan v. Poole 54 the court discusses the cases on this
question, including Warlow v. Harrison, but since the announce-
ment of the sale there involved did not contain a statement that
the sale would be without reserve or its equivalent the opinion does
not directly bear on the question here under discussion. However
the McPherson and Anderson Cases are cited with apparent ap-
proval.
In only one of the American cases-the Anderson Case-does
the court go into the question exhaustively. But the factual
situation in that case, as has already been pointed out, did not
include an express announcement that the sale would be without
reserve. In none of the American cases are the differentiating
factors herein stated even referred to, and in each case the court
bases its conclusion directly or indirectly on an assumed analogy
with the cases of the Payne v. Cave type. All of the American
cases are suits by the bidder, in which connection it is worthy of
note that the legislatures of each of the states whose courts have
considered this question, by adopting the Uniform Sales Act,55
52(1911) 37 App. D. C. 282.
53(1865) 3 Wall. (U.S.) 196, 18 L. Ed. 43.
54(1915) 37 R. 1. 489, 93 Atl. 786, 94 At. 152, L. R. A. 1917A 63, Ann.
Cas. 1918A 841.55Massachusetts, Gen Laws 1921, ch. 106. secs. 3-65; New York, Con-
solidated Laws, Cahill 1923, ch. 42, secs. 82-158; Washington, Laws 1925,
ch. 142: Minnesota, Mason's 1927 Stat. secs. 8376-8455; Rhode Island, Gen.
Laws 1923, tit. 30, ch. 305-311, secs. 4427-4503.
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have given the highest bidder a right of action to enforce the
purchase if the sale be announced to be without reserve.
The situation in America then is this: the collateral contract
theory has been adopted in no state; the direct contract theory, so
far as the bidder's rights are concerned, has been adopted in those
states whose codes have followed the Field Code as well as in
those states that have enacted the Uniform Sales Act; while some
cases disapprove the direct contract theory here urged they are
based almost entirely on analogies which seem unfounded. Fur-
ther, in so far as these cases indicate a social policy of no' liability
until the vendor assents their force is lessened by the legislative
adoption of the rule giving the vendee the right to enforce the
sale without such assent. Still further, the direct contract theory
is in line with the elementary principle of contract law that a
manifestation of intention is an offer when such as to lead the
person addressed, acting reasonably, to believe that the power to
create a contract is conferred upon him. Indeed it is believed
that anyone reading an announcement of an auction without re-
serve c6uld reasonably come to no other conclusion but that such
power was conferred.
The American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of
Contracts supports the position herein urged, section 27 of the
Official Draft thereof being as follows:
"Auctions; Sales Without Reserve.-At an auction, the auc-
tioneer merely invites offers from successive bidders unless, by
announcing that the sale is without reserve or by other means, he
indicates that he is making an offer to sell at any price bid by the
highest bidder."
While the language used in the Restatement reaches the point
under discussion only inferentially, there can be no escape from
the conclusion that the direct contract theory is approved therein.
If further evidence be needed it is found in the explanatory note
appended to section 27:
"It must be possible.., for an auctioneer, if he uses appropri-
ate language, to become the offeror. An announcement that goods
will be sold to the highest bidder has this effect. Fairly inter-
preted the language means that the auctioneer promises that who-
ever makes the highest bid shall become owner of the subject
matter of the sale."
In those states which have adopted either the Field Code or the
Uniform Sales Act the conclusion here urged cannot be followed
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in full, because of the provision therein contained that in all cases
the bidder may withdraw until the hammer falls. As a matter of
practical justice the statutory rule referred to takes care of most
cases which require relief, notwithstanding the fact that its text
in this connection is based in a misinterpretation of Warlow v.
Harrison and involves a contractual impossibility. As a matter of
contract law section 27 of the Restatement would be a vast im-
provement on section 21 (2) of the Uniform Sales Act and the
corresponding section of the Field Code, and it is to be hoped that
the time may come when the legislatures will substitute it or its
equivalent for the sections referred to. Until that time the Field
Code and its follower in this respect, the Uniform Sales Act,
stand in the curious position of perpetuating in the law of a ma-
jority of American states the underlying policy of the rule here
supported and at the same time preventing its complete adoption.
The problem under discussion also illustrates the utility of
such a project as the American Law Institute's Restatement.
Throughout the English and American cases and statutes the rule
here supported has kept cropping out in one form or another,
notwithstanding a good deal of critical disapproval. In addition
it is theoretically sound, and not truly inconsistent with other well
settled rules. Nor are there controlling and well reasoned cases
to the contrary. These things being so, the inclusion of the rule
here urged in the Restatement seems altogether proper. Perhaps
in no other way, in view of the confusion in the cases on the point,
could the matter be so effectively clarified.56
56The Restatement of the Law of Contracts has already been cited
with approval by many courts. Examples in Minnesota are: Heins v.
Byers, (1928) 174 Minn. 350, 219 N. W. 287; Peterson v. Parviainen,
(1928) 174 Minn. 297, 219 N. W. 180; Cruickshank v. Ellis, (1929) 178
Minn. 103, 226 N. W. 192.
